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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WALTER LARSON, ALEIDA P.
LARSON and JON LARSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
ROBERT GEORGE EVANS,
M.D.,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 9365

BRIEF OF RESPON'DENT
STATElVi:ENT OF FACTS
The respondent does not accept or agree with
the statement of facts in Appellants' brief. Plaintiff's statement of facts is incomplete and contains
only one paragraph relating to the testimony of Jon
Larson. The testimony of plaintiffs' witness was
inconsistent and contradictory and appellants' have
excluded most of the inconsistent ·and contradictory
evidence which showed contributory negligence on
the part of Jon Larson from plaintiffs' brief.
The following statement is submitted to supplement and clarify plaintiffs' statement of facts.
1
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SPECIAL INTERROGATORY

Special interrogatories were submitted to the
jury by the court (R. 440) and the jury answered
'interrogatory No. 1 "yes" (R. 440) saying that the
,negligence of Robert George Evans caused or contributed to the cause of the accident and the injuries
of which plaintiffs complain (R. 440).
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE S'HOWING
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

On cross examination Jon Larson testified the
accident occurred on a dry, clear night and at a
time when there was no other traffic entering the
'intersection from the North or West (R. 405). The
,plaintiff driver testified the only lights in the area
were on the Southwest corner of the intersection
60 to 70 feet away (R. 405, 406). Jon Darson
testified he used the intersection regularly, at least
three times a day, and that because a friend of his
was injured in the intersection he knew his exact
speed and had slowed down to 25 miles per hour at
the time he entered the intersection (R. 409). The
'.plaintiff driver testified he did not see the defendant's car until he was in the intersection (R. 409,
410 )and that he was going 25 miles per hour at
the time he first saw the defendant's car ( R. 409).
Jon Larson testified the defendant's car was
going at least twice as fast as he was going (R.
2
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409). Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4 showed plaintiff's car
travelled 52 feet after the impact and that defendant's car travelled only 50 feet after the impact.
Exhibit P-4 also shows place of impact as in the
Northeast quadrant of the intersection. Officer Gunn
testified defendant's vehicle left no skid marks (R.
130). Officer Gunn, plaintiff's witness, testified
Larson car left 40 feet of skrd marks prior to impact (R. 199).
1

At time Jon Larson's deposition was taken he
testified he never saw the defendant's auto until
the front end of his car was at the middle of Evergreen ( R. 410). Also Jon Larson admitted he had
no recollection of using his br akes until he heard
Officer Gunn testify (R. 19 9). When Jon Larson's
deposition was taken he told us he did not apply
his brakes ( R. 199) .
1

1

Inconsistently, Jon Larson testified as set forth
in page 4 of Appellants' brief that he saw the headlights of defendant's car for two seconds (R. 173)
and from that observation formed an opinion ~as to
its speed (R.173).
Then on cross examination Jon Larson testified he di'd not see the defendant's car until it was
into the intersection (R. 409, 'R. 198).
Further, Jon Larson testified, inconsistently,
saying as he entered the intersection he had no
3
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thought of anyone approaching from the East (R.
171) 'and then turned around and said for two
seconds (R. 173) he observed defendant's car to
form an opinion as to it's speed ( R. 173) .
Jon Larson's testimony after the accident showed he was not confused and that imr.aediately he ran
over to the drug store and called an an1bulance
(R. 173, 1'74). Also, he claimed to have no diffiiculty in recollecting what Dr. Evans said at the
'scene of the accident (R. 174, 175).
Jon Larson's testimony about his income was
interesting. At ti'rne of trial he testified he had a
monthly salary of $500.00 (R. 194). Another time
he admitted under oath (R. 202, 203) that in his
deposition he told me he was m'aking $1,000.00 per
month. This latter statement was an exaggeration,
said Jon Larson ( R. '203, '204).
At the trial plaintiffs requested no instruction
on the speed lin1it in the area on 23rd East '(R. 21\3'7), and offered no evidence on the posted speed
limit. Further, plaintiffs did not object to the court
giving Instruction No. 4 ( R. 69).
OFFICER GUNN

Plaintiffs called Officer Gunn 'as an expert witness on speed of plaintiff's vehicle ( R. 419) . Offi.cer Gunn testified that based only on the 40 foot
skid mark it was his opinion Jon Larson was going
30 miles per hour (R. 419). Officer Gunn also on
4
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cross examination told us that in estimating the
speed of Jon Larson's vehicle he di'd not take into
consideration in making his estimrate of speed on
the plaintiff's car the amount of physical damage
to e'ach vehicle ( R. 425), any braking prior to the
skid marks (R. 425) and admitted that where the
cars came to rest, the amount of damage and shadow
marks of tires should have been considered in making an estimate of speed based on physical evidence
( R. 425). Officer Gunn also said the damage to
each car was considerable ( R. 424) rand said all of
the skid marks he considered were left by the Larson
vehicle prior to the time o'f impact.
Exhibit P-4 and the testimony of Office Gunn
(R. 131) shows the path of each vehicle prior to
and after the impact. Likewise, on voir dire examination Officer Gunn testified that there was no
hedge (R. 121) and thrat his measurement began
from the corner of the house ( R. 121) and not from
the hedge as plain tiffs' counsel says on page 4 of
Appellants' brief.
Officer Gunn also testified ( R. 126) that at
the time defendant noticed the plaintiff's auto first
it was approximately 50 feet away when the defendant entered the intersection (R. 12'5). Defendant
also admitted that as he entered the intersection
he was going at a speed of 30 miles per hour (R.
126).
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit P-4 shows the Larson car travelled a
distance a:bout twice as far as the Evans car in
the same amount of time and at a time when the
defendant admitted he was going as much as 30
miles per hour ( R. 126) .

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS CONFLICTING AND
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ITON
LARSON AND THAT JON LARSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTE'D
TO THE ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES.
POINT II
THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES IS FOR THE
J·URY TO DECIDE.

THE LOWER
ING TO DIRECT
PLAINTIFF AND
TION FOR NE'W

POINT III
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSA VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTRIAL.

POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR PREJUDICIALLY IN
GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 3.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR PRErrUDICALLY IN
SIUB'MITTING INSTR'UCTION NO. 8.
6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS CONFLICTING AND
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF JON
LARSON AND THAT JON LARSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED
TO THE ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES.

Where judgment is rendered on conflicting evidence, the evidence will be reviewed on appeal in
the light most favorable to the person for whom
judgment was rendered in the court below. W eenig
Bros. Inc. vs. Manning, 1 Utah 2nd 101, 26!2 P 2nd
491; North vs. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516, 2'29 P.
2nd 871; Staton vs. Western Maoaroni Manufacturing Company, 52 Utah 426, 174 P. 821. Likewise
in Martin vs. Sheffield, 112 U. 478, 189 P. 2nd 127,
where there was conflicting testimony with regard
to an intersection collision, this court said where
reasonable minds might differ as to which version
of events should be believed and as to whether plaintiffs conduct contributed to the accildent the case
should be submitted to the jury.
Where a witness modifies or varies his testimony in cross examination a particular part .of his
testimony on direct examination which was favor, able may not be singled out to the exclusion of other
parts of equal importance bearing on the subject.
'Alvardo vs. Tucker, 2 Utah 2nd 16, 268 P. 2nd 986.
There were many conflicts in the plaintiff's
1

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

testimony. On cross examination (R. 409, 19'8) Jon
Larson testified he did not see the defendant's car
until it was in the intersection. On direct examination when he wanted to talk about the speed of
the defendant's car he said he observed the defendant's car for two seconds (R. l73). Jon lJarson
testified as he entered the intersection (R. 171)
he had no thought of anyone approaching from the
east. The point of impact was less than one car
length from the east curb line of 23rd East (See
Exhibit P-4). Yet, Jon Larson claimed to have observed the defendant's car for two seconds prior
to the impact to judge it's speed (R. 173).
When Jon Larson's deposition was taken he
told me he did not apply his brakes (R. 199). After
Jon Larson heard Officer Gunn testify he said he
believed he used his brakes ( R. 199) . At the time
Jon Larson's deposition was taken he testified he
never saw the defendant's auto until the front of
his car was at the middle of Evergreen (R. 410).
But on direct examination he testified (R. 199) he
was applying the brakes of his car as he entered the
intersection.
On direct examination (R. -171) Jon Larson
testified his speed was 20 miles per hour as he passed the market on the Southwest corner of the intersection. Later he testified as he entered the intersection his speed was 25 miles per hour (R. 171,
8
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409). Thereafter plain tiffs called Officer Gunn as
an expert witness (R. 419) and Officer Gunn testified that based on the 40 foot skid mark only it
was his opinion Jon Larson was going 30 miles
per hour. On cross examination Officer Gunn hastened to add that in estimating the speed of Jon
Larson he did not consider in making his estimate
the distance Jon Larson's car might have travelled
before it left visible skid marks, the force of the
impact and the considerable damage to each vehicle, and the distance each vehicle travelled after
the impact ( R. 425) .
Plaintiffs own witness testified that the speed
of plaintiff's car was greater than 30 miles per
hour. Enough greater to do considera:ble damage
to each vehicle and to carry it 52 feet beyond the
point of impact. This was another conflict in plaintiffs' case and there was substantial evidence to
show plain tiff's speed was considerably in excess
of 30 miles per hour.
Plaintiff's examination of the defendant (R.
123) ~as well as the testimony of plaintiff's witness
Clifford Coon ( R. 134) shows this accident occurred
in a residential area. Mr. Coon testified he liveld
in a house on the corner (R. 134).
Section 41-6-46 (2) (b) provides the speed limit
in a residential area is 25 miles per hour and this
is so whether it be day or night.
9
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Jon Larson testified he was familiar with this
intersection and knew it to be a dangerous intersection ( R. 40'9) . He claimed to be particularly
alert as he entered the intersection (R. 409).
Under such circumstances it is established law
that what is a reasonable and prudent speed under
the conditions and having regard for actual and
potential hazards then existing is a matter about
which there is room for considerable disagreement
and such being the case a jury question is presented.
Lodder vs. Western Pacific R. Company, 123 U.
(316, 250 P. 2nd 589, 59'3.
Jon Larson admitted he just slowed down to
25 as he entered the intersection ( R. 409). Officer
Gunn testified pl'aintiff's car skidded into the intersection (R. 128). That indicates a substantial speed
in excess of 25 miles per hour.
Exhibit P-4 shows impa;ct occurred on plaintiff's side of road and that although Jon Larson
testified (R. 405) there was no traffic entering the
intersection from the North or West he did not have
control enough to swerve his car to the unused side
of the road.
The defendant immediately turned to the North
(R. 116) and it appears without doubt that if the
plaintiff had been keeping any lookout and driving
at a -reasonable speed he could have swerved and
avoided the collision.
10
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Many times this court has S aid the question of
proximate cause is for the jury. In Sweet vs. Salt
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 325, 134 P. 1;167, this
court said whether the speed at which the vehicle
was going at the time of the accident was the proximate cause of the accident was ~a question of fact.
In Horsley vs. Robinson, 11'2 U. 22'7, 186 P. 2nd
592, this court again said the question of excessive
speed and proximate cause was for the jury.
On the question of lookout in Devereaux vs.
Gener,al Electric Company, 5 Utah 2nd 433, 304 P.
2nd 375, this court said where plaintiff failed to
see defendants approaching car on the highway as
plaintiff was entering the highway, it was for the
jury to decide if the plaintiffs negligent failure to
see the defendant's car was the proxim ate cause of
the collision.
1

1

The question of keeping a proper lookout is
generally a jury question. Coombs vs. Perry. 2 Utah
2nd 381, 275 P. 2nd 680; Stickle vs. Union Pacific
Railroad Company, 1'22 Utah 477, 2'51 P. 2nd 86'7;
Lowder vs. Holley, 120 Utah ·2 31, 233 P. 2nd 350.
In Martin vs. Sheffield, 1'12 Utah 478, 189 P. 2nd
127, where accident arose out of intersection collision this court said the question as to the contributory negligence of the plain tiff in failing to keep
a proper lookout was for the jury.
1

The rights of users of the highways are rela11
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tive, and one is not relieved of the duty of using due
care simply because he is the apparent possessor of
the right of way and the question is whose negligence was the proximate cause of the 'accident and
injury. Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company,
106 Utah 289, 147 P. 2nd 8'75, 878, Bullock vs.
Lake, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2nd 3i50.
Jon larson's testimony was conflicting in all
respects 'and it was properly submitted to the jury
to evaluate.
This court in considering the plaintiffs' appeal
must review the evidence, together with every inference fairly arising therefrom in the light most
favorable to the defendant who prevailed in the
court below. Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 121 Utah 37, 239 P. 2nd 163, Coombs
vs. Perry, 2 Utah 2nd '2'8, '27:5 P. 2nd 680.
POINT II
THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES IS FOR THE
JURY TO DECIDE.

Jon Larson admitted he did not see the defendant's car until he was right upon it in the intersection '(R. 40'9, 198). Later he claimed to have
observed it for two seconds ( R. 1'73) going at a
terrifi~ speed. Later he said he had no thought of
anyone 'approaching the intersection from the East
(R. 171). Yet, plaintiffs called Officer Gunn who
testified ( R. 419) plaintiffs car was skidding long
before it reached the intersection.
12
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Jon Larson claimed he could not see through
the hedge and did not see defendant's car until it
was entering the intersection. The skid marks and
testimony of Officer Gunn as well as Jon lJarson's
~statement that he observed the defendant's car for
two seconds ( R. 173) controvert his claim that the
hedge was dense and if believed would show he was
warned of defendant's approach by defendant auto
h~adlights and could not stop because of his speed
or because he did not heed the warning in time.
The credibility of a witness is for the jury.
Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2nd 392, 284 P. 2nd
1115; Martin vs. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2nd
747; Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 122 Utah 312, Re. 1'23
Utah 281,249 P. 2nd 213.
Likevvise, when a witness, whose i1npeachment
is attempted, is a party to the action, the witness'
prior contradictory statement is ~an admission
against interest and may be considered both as an
admission and for the purpose of testimony the
credibility of the witness. Rose vs. Otis (1892)
- Colorado -, 31 Pac. 49'3; State vs. H ougensen,
91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2nd 229. If a witness willfully
testifies ftalsely as to any material matter, the jury
ls at liberty to disbelieve the whole of the witness'
testimony. Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2n d 39'2,
284 P. 2nd 1115. Also, the jury, in determining
whether, and to what extent to believe a witness,
may consider the witness' appearance, general de1

13
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meanor, manner of expression and candor or want
of it in answering questions on both direct and cross
eX~amination. Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2nd 392,
284 P. 2nd 1115.
The general rule is that a party will not be permitted to change his story to make out a case. In
Tebbs vs. Peterson, 1'2'2 Utah 214, 247 P. 2nd 89'7,
where at first trial the plaintiff said he di'dn't remember seeing any cars coming toward him 'and
where at second trial plaintiff said he was blinded
'by oncoming lights, and where trial court directed
a verdict for the defendant, this court said the
plaintiff was bound by his prior testimony and will
not be permitted to change his story to m'ake out a
case.
It follows that in this case Jon Larson was
bound by his prior testimony ( R. 410) on the question of keeping a proper lookout and should not
have been permitted to change his story to show he
observed defendant's car for two seconds (R. 173)
just to rebut defendant's claim he was not keeping
a proper lookout.
THE LOWER
ING TO DIRECT
PLAINTIFF AN'D
TION FOR NE·w

POINT III
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSA VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' l\1:0TRIAL.

Defendant incorporates herein the argument
set forth under Points I and II.
14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR PREJUDICIALLY IN
GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 3.

In Toone vs. J. P. O'Neill Construction Company, 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, the court gave the
following instruction to which appellant objected.
The request was as follows:
"If you find from the evidence that the
plaintiff upon his own judgment uninfluenced
by any a:ssurance of safety on part of the defendant's forem an, a:s to whether or not the
place he was standing at the time he fired
the shot was safe, or if you find that the
plaintiff selected the place but he fired the
blast without dire-ctions or suggestions of the
defendant's foreman, then the defendant is not
liable, and you should deturn a verdict for
the defendant.
On appeal when appellant objected this court said:
" ... One way the court might have followed in charging the jury would have been
to charge them in separate instructions, first,
in accordance with respondent's evidence ;
and second in accordance with appellants evidence which related to the proposition covered
by the instruction in question, a~d in each instruction have directed the jury to return a
verdict in accordance with their findings upon that question. The court was not bound
to charge the jury in separate instructions,
but could cover the question in one without
offending against appellant's rights."
It is clear from the Toone case in Utah you
can instruct on unrelated propositions in the same
1

15
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instruction and that appellant has not accurately
cited the holding of the Toone case in appellant's
brief. Toone vs. J. P. O'Neill Construction Company, 40 Utah '265, 121 P. 10.
Nor does the case of Riding vs. Roylance, 63
Utah 221, '224 P. 885, as'Sist appellant. In the
Riding case, the trial court erred in instructing
jury that defendant would not be liable if driver
was not employee and this instruction was held misleading as the undisputed evidence was contrary
and hence the instruction was prejudicial in character. 63 Utah 221, 224 P. 885.
1

1

Instruction No. 3 was short and concise. It was
not an instruction upon contributory negligence but
merely an explanation to the jury what the effect
of contributory negligence on the part of Jon Larson
would be on the other plaintilfs. It was explanatory
only in character and was a correct statern en t of
law.
It appears Judge Faux was following the admonition in J.I.F.U. given at page XV wherein it
is said, "The fewer instructions given the better".
This instrU'ction obviously had no prejudicial
~effect.

POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR PRE'J UDICALLY IN
SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION NO. 8.
1

· The ne'gligen'ce of the defendant was found to
16
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be a proximate cause of the accident. He admitted
his fault and further the jury in answering Interrogatory No. 1 (R. 182) showed they were not confused about the defendant's negligence as they
found it proximately caused the accident and the
injuries of which the pl'aintiff complained.
Instruction No. 8 is found in J.I.F.U._ 2.3 at
page 12, and of course, is a recommended Jury instruction form.
The instruction was necessary because defendant had to prove by a preponderance of the evi1dence that Jon Larson was contributorily negl'igent
!and that his negligence proximately contributed to
the accident 'and the injuries of which plaintiffs
complained.
Since the special interrogatories show the jury
was not confused the cases cited in appellants' brief
involving verdicts are not in point.
CONCLUSION
Because of the ( 1) inconsistent and contradictory statements of Jon Larson relating to lookout
and speed, ( 2) the conflicting testimony of Jon
Larson as contrasted to the physical facts with regard to speed and lookout, ( 3) the question of the
credibility of the plaintiffs statements, and ( 4) the
testimony of Officer Gunn, there was substantial
evidence upon which the jury properly found Jon
17
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Larson guilty of contributory negligence and that'
the same proximately contributed to the accident.
As Judge Faux said in his Memorandum Decision (R. 103) there was too much evidence of contributory negligence to let the jury say no contributory negligence and the verdict was justified.
Further, a review of the case shows the court
below did not err prejudicially.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY
Attorney for the Defendant
and Respondent
203 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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